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II. “JUSTICE” IN ACTION 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS LATER:   
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AFTER A 
CENTURY OF RESEARCH 
JON B. GOULD* & RICHARD A. LEO**
 
 
In this Article, the authors analyze a century of research on the causes 
and consequences of wrongful convictions in the American criminal justice 
system while explaining the many lessons of this body of work.  This Article 
chronicles the range of research that has been conducted on wrongful 
convictions; examines the common sources of error in the criminal justice 
system and their effects; suggests where additional research and attention 
are needed; and discusses methodological strategies for improving the 
quality of research on wrongful convictions.  The authors argue that 
traditional sources of error (eyewitness misidentification, false confessions, 
perjured testimony, forensic error, tunnel vision, prosecutorial misconduct, 
ineffective assistance of counsel, etc.) are contributing sources, not 
exclusive causes, of wrongful convictions.  They also argue that the 
research on wrongful convictions has uncovered a great deal about how 
these sources operate and what might prevent their effects.  Finally, the 
authors urge criminal justice professionals and policymakers to take this 
research more seriously and apply the lessons learned from a century of 
research into wrongful convictions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost a century ago in the predecessor to this Journal,1 Yale law 
professor Edwin Borchard kicked off the study of wrongful convictions in 
the modern era2 when he published an article on European approaches to 
“unjust convictions.”3  Almost a century later, professors Samuel Gross and 
Barbara O’Brien published a critical assessment of the state of knowledge 
on wrongful conviction.  Arguing that researchers “do not know much 
about false convictions” and that “it will be difficult to learn more,” they 
concluded that the “main message is gloomy.”4 
Although both of us greatly respect the work of Gross and O’Brien—
indeed, Gross is a leading, perhaps even the leading, scholar in the field at 
the moment—we disagree with their conclusion about the state of 
knowledge.  To be sure, questions remain about the representative 
characteristics of all (i.e., known and unknown) wrongful convictions and 
their prevalence, queries that may prove difficult ever to answer.  Nor do 
we yet have a good grasp on how the sources of wrongful convictions differ 
from the frailties found in criminal cases as a whole.  But to say we know 
little about the subject, we believe, is not fully to appreciate the import of 
decades of research on wrongful convictions, and especially some of the 
most insightful work that has been conducted in the last two decades. 
In this Article, we analyze nearly a century’s worth of research into 
wrongful convictions, explaining the many lessons of this body of work and 
suggesting where additional research and attention are needed.  The Article 
is divided into four sections.  In Part II, we chronicle the range of research 
that has been conducted over the last several decades and explain how it has 
changed in form.  Part III is the bulk of the Article and where we address 
the challenge provided by Gross and O’Brien.  We begin this section by 
 
1 Until 1932, the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology was known as the Journal of 
the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. 
2 Professor Bruce Smith traces interest in wrongful convictions back to seventeenth 
century England, with many “influential treatise writers and public officials . . . urg[ing] the 
courts [to] adopt stricter evidentiary safeguards in capital cases.”  Bruce P. Smith, The 
History of Wrongful Execution, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1185, 1188-89 (2005).  In America, 
Borchard’s article, and his later book, which is described in Part II, infra, are among the 
earliest, most cited publications on wrongful convictions.  
3 Edwin M. Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal 
Justice, 3 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 684 (1913). 
4 Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Convictions: 
Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927, 
958 (2008).  Gross and O’Brien emphasize that there are no good case level data on accurate 
criminal convictions in the United States, or on all criminal convictions, with which to 
compare data on exonerations (which they treat as an imperfect proxy for a subset of likely 
wrongful convictions that are known), and that 95% of known exonerations occur in cases of 
murder and rape, which only account for 2% of all felony convictions.  Id. at 937-40. 
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acknowledging questions about the rate of wrongful convictions and argue 
that, whatever the correct figure, wrongful convictions are far from rare in 
the criminal justice system.  We then turn to the effects of wrongful 
convictions, describing the several harms of erroneous prosecutions and 
convictions that researchers have identified.  From there, we address the 
sources of these errors and seek to categorize the various findings about 
these factors.  Our overall argument in this section is two-fold: first, we 
should consider these factors as contributing sources, not exclusive causes, 
of wrongful convictions; and second, the research has actually uncovered a 
great deal about how these sources operate and what remedies might 
prevent their effect. 
Although the research has identified a common set of sources, we 
agree with Gross and O’Brien that the methodology for studying wrongful 
convictions could be improved.  In Part IV we discuss those studies that 
have used matched comparison samples and explain how the field could be 
improved by additional research that employs such comparisons or controls.  
Finally, in Part IV, we turn the tables, contending that improvement is 
needed less in the quality of research than within the professional, policy, 
and political communities that might employ the lessons learned from the 
wrongful convictions research.  With all of the information that has been 
amassed over the last century of inquiry, it is embarrassing to the point of 
shameful that criminal justicians, policymakers, and politicians do not 
follow the example of other professions and seek to learn from and prevent 
systemic error.5
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF RESEARCH ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
  We have no doubt that researchers will continue to expand 
our understanding of wrongful convictions in the years ahead.  But unless 
those charged with maintaining our criminal justice system are open to 
those findings and are willing to act on the lessons learned, the research 
may become, quite literally, an academic exercise. 
In 1913, Edwin Borchard’s article opened the eyes of American 
observers to the scourge of wrongful convictions by describing European 
approaches to righting the wrongs of erroneous convictions.6  Twenty years 
later, his book, Convicting the Innocent: Sixty-Five Actual Errors of 
Criminal Justice, created a stir when it identified sixty-five cases in which 
an innocent person had been convicted.7
 
5 See James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010). 
  Borchard also classified the likely 
6 Borchard, supra note 3. 
7 EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932). 
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“sources of error including erroneous eyewitness testimony, false 
confessions, faulty circumstantial evidence, and prosecutorial excesses.”8  
Yet, for the next fifty years, research on wrongful convictions was sporadic.  
“Typically, one big-picture book or major article [was] published every 
decade or so on the subject of miscarriages of justice,” many of which 
“followed a familiar structure.”9  Authors would assert the importance of 
clearing the innocent; they would describe cases in which an innocent 
defendant had been convicted; and they would close by proposing reforms 
to prevent future errors.  Among those who followed in this literary path 
were Erle Stanley Gardner, creator of the fictional defense lawyer Perry 
Mason,10 and Judge Jerome Frank, who collaborated with his daughter 
Barbara on the book, Not Guilty.11
“Until the late 1980s, it might have seemed bizarre, if not incoherent, 
to suggest that the study of miscarriages of justice constituted a field or area 
of academic study, rather than merely a series of unrelated and relatively 
infrequent articles and books.”
 
12  However, in 1987, Hugo Bedau and 
Michael Radelet published their groundbreaking study in the Stanford Law 
Review, claiming that 350 individuals had been wrongly convicted in 
potentially capital cases over much of the twentieth century.13  In addition 
to describing the facts of these cases, Bedau and Radelet systematically 
analyzed the sources of these errors and the methods by which the mistakes 
had been discovered.  Their work led to a florescence of research on 
wrongful convictions, inspiring others to research and write about the 
sources and consequences of wrongful convictions,14
 
8 Smith, supra note 
 as well as to re-
2, at 1216. 
9 Richard A. Leo, Re-thinking the Study of Miscarriages of Justice: Developing a 
Criminology of Wrongful Convictions, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 201, 203 (2005). 
10 Among other things, Gardner created the “Court of Last Resort,” an unofficial body to 
investigate suspected cases of wrongful conviction.  Steve Weinberg, A Short History of 
Exposing Misconduct, in CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING 
AMERICA’S LOCAL PROSECUTORS (2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
pm/default.aspx?act=sidebarsb&aid=37. 
11 JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957). 
12 Leo, supra note 9, at 204. 
13 Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially 
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 23 (1987). 
14 See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the 
Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 907 (2004); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The 
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in 
the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998). 
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analyze15 and extend their findings.16  All the while, they have continued to 
collect, analyze, and publish data about wrongful conviction cases.17
Bedau and Radelet’s article was followed in the 1990s by a series of 
books on the subject.
 
18  Often following a “familiar plot”19 of works like 
Borchard’s 1932 book, these publications once again reminded the reading 
public that wrongful conviction cases were real, that they contravened the 
ideals of the American criminal justice system, that they had common 
sources, and that these errors ought to be rectified.  Yet, for the attention 
these books may have received, everything paled in the face of the 
revolution that arrived in the 1990s when DNA testing became feasible and 
affordable in many cases.20  Once limited to such imperfect techniques as 
serology testing or hair comparison analysis,21
 
15 See James Acker et al., No Appeal From the Grave: Innocence, Capital Punishment, 
and the Lessons of History, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 154 
(Saundra Westervelt & John Humphrey eds., 2001). 
 law enforcement officials 
found that they could test biological evidence for common genetic links 
between perpetrators and potential suspects, permitting results that were 
16 Samuel Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in 
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 494 (1996); see also Samuel Gross, Lost Lives: 
Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1998). 
17 MICHAEL L. RADELET, HUGO ADAM BEDAU & CONSTANCE E. PUTNAM, IN SPITE OF 
INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992); Hugo Adam Bedau & 
Michael L. Radelet, Convicting the Innocent in Capital Cases: Criteria, Evidence, and 
Inference, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 587 (2004); Michael L. Radelet, William S. Lofquist & Hugo 
Adam Bedau, Prisoners Released from Death Row Since 1970 Because of Doubts About 
Their Guilt, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 907 (1996); Michael L. Radelet & Hugo Adam Bedau, 
The Execution of the Innocent, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (1998); Michael L. Radelet, 
The Role of Innocence Argument in Contemporary Death Penalty Debates, 41 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 199 (2008). 
18 DONALD CONNERY, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: THE STORY OF A MURDER, A FALSE 
CONFESSION AND THE STRUGGLE TO FREE A WRONGED MAN (1996); RONALD HUFF, ARYE 
RATTNER & EDWARD SAGARIN, CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1996); MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY: WHEN INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE 
WRONGLY CONVICTED (1991). 
19 By that, we mean descriptive analyses of harrowing cases of wrongful conviction.  
These stories are often told in the style of “good guys” (the innocent defendant) succumbing 
to the efforts of “bad guys” (hard-charging police officers or prosecutors), who ignore 
exculpatory evidence, only to be freed by the efforts of dedicated advocates who never 
doubted the innocence of the wrongly convicted.  These stories usually close with 
recommendations for “familiar policy solutions” to prevent future wrongful convictions.  
Leo, supra note 9, at 207. 
20 DNA testing of course became available both as an investigative tool in some cases 
that have not yet gone to trial as well as in some postconviction cases.  To date, virtually all 
postconviction DNA exonerations have occurred in rape or rape and murder cases.  Samuel 
R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 528-29 (2005).  
21 These and other forensic testing methods are discussed in Part II.C, infra. 
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infinitely more accurate.  Innocent defendants also recognized the potential 
of DNA testing to clear them even after conviction if biological evidence 
from the crime scene had been retained.  In what appeared to be an 
avalanche of cases over the next decade, advocates have managed to 
exonerate over 250 innocent persons of crimes they had not committed, 
including several defendants who had been on death row.22  Even more 
individuals have been exonerated in this period in cases not involving DNA 
testing.23
These cases rightly drew media attention to the frailties of the criminal 
justice system and, perhaps more importantly, revealed serious problems in 
everyday police work.  In 1996, the National Institute of Justice released a 
report noting that in “every year since 1989, in about 25 percent of the 
sexual assault cases referred to the FBI . . . the primary suspect has been 
excluded by DNA testing.”
 
24
The advent of DNA testing not only generated more attention for, and 
research about, wrongful convictions, but it also seemed to have pushed 
academicians from “pure” research to research/advocacy.  Here, the 
influence of Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld cannot be underestimated.  
Two former legal aid attorneys, the pair founded the Innocence Project in 
1992 at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  Today, the Innocence 
Project (IP) is a non-profit legal clinic that “handles cases where post-
conviction DNA testing of evidence can yield conclusive proof of 
innocence.  As a clinic, students handle the case work while supervised by a 
team of attorneys and clinic staff.”
  Put another way, among rape cases referred 
to the FBI for DNA testing, law enforcement officers had been wrong one 
out of every four times in naming an initial suspect. 
25
 
22 See The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010). 
  The IP has led successful efforts to 
exonerate hundreds of innocent defendants.  It also has spawned the 
creation of regional innocence projects and legal clinics at law schools 
around the country.  Among the most famous is Northwestern University’s 
Center on Wrongful Conviction and Medill Innocence Project, at which law 
and journalism professors, along with their students and professional 
journalists, were the catalysts for a statewide investigation into wrongful 
convictions in Illinois.  In an unprecedented move in 2000, then-Governor 
George Ryan commuted all death sentences and imposed a moratorium on 
23 Gross et al., supra note 20, at 529 tbl.1. 
24 EDWARD CONNORS, THOMAS LUNDREGAN, NEAL MILLER & TOM MCEWEN, CONVICTED 
BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL xxviii (1996). 
25 About the Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 
3, 2010).  
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further executions until a special commission and the General Assembly 
addressed the several problems in investigations and prosecutions that had 
led to more convicted murderers released from prison upon questions of 
their guilt than actually executed over a twenty-two-year period.26
Illinois is not alone; North Carolina,
 
27 Virginia,28 and California have 
also seen innocence commissions, modeled in many ways on the Criminal 
Case Review Commission (CCRC) in the United Kingdom and the Royal 
Commissions of Inquiry in Canada.  The Royal Commissions have been 
available for over a century, with national and provincial governments 
permitted to conduct independent, nongovernment-affiliated investigations 
regarding the conduct of public businesses or the fair administration of 
justice.29  Two of the most famous examples of the commissions were those 
investigating the exonerations of Guy Paul Morin and Thomas Sophonow.30  
More recently, the U.K. established the CCRV in 1997.  The CCRV has 
jurisdiction over criminal cases from any Magistrates’ or Crown Court in 
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland “to review possible miscarriages of 
justice and decide if they should be referred to an appeal court.”31




26 Thomas P. Sullivan, Repair or Repeal: The Report of the Illinois Governor’s 
Commission on Capital Punishment, 26 CHAMPION 10 (2002). 
 research has been instrumental in 
assisting innocence or related government commissions to establish “best 
practices” to prevent wrongful convictions, whether in the United States or 
abroad.  Among these best practices are sequential, double-blind eyewitness 
identification procedures and electronically recorded interrogations.  
Indeed, in many ways, we have reached the point where researchers are 
now performing a dual function with regard to wrongful convictions; on 
one level scholars are conducting research for its intrinsic insight into the 
functioning of the criminal justice system; on another level, researchers 
have become instruments of reform, working alongside policymakers to 
27 Although Illinois’s Ryan Commission often gets the most press coverage, in many 
ways the North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission deserves greater attention since it 
was the first in the nation and remains an ongoing entity.  See Christine C. Mumma, The 
North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspectives Joined by a 
Common Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 647 (2004). 
28 Unlike the other innocence commissions, the Virginia Innocence Commission was a 
private organization, not a government commission.  See JON GOULD, THE INNOCENCE 
COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (2007). 
29 Watson Sellar, A Century of Commissions of Inquiry, 25 CAN. BAR REV. 1 (1947).  
30 Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the Formation of “Innocence 
Commissions,” 86 JUDICATURE 100 (2002). 
31 Criminal Cases Review Commission, Our Role (Overview), http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/ 
about/about_27.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
32 See infra Part III.C. 
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implement the lessons their research uncovers.  That alone is a significant 
step in the near-century of inquiry, one that Borchard hardly may have 
expected when he first published his article in the predecessor to this 
Journal.33
III. WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
 
A. PREVALENCE OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
Despite the numerous studies into wrongful conviction, there remains 
considerable debate about the extent of the problem.  According to 
University of Southern California law professor Dan Simon, the “overall 
rate of error in the criminal justice system is unknown, and unknowable.”34  
Simon is correct that we may never know precisely how many wrongful 
convictions occur, but already research has greatly narrowed the range.  
Virtually no one denies the existence of wrongful convictions, while the 
several studies on this question cap estimates at around 3% to 5% of 
convictions.35
Much of the variation in these estimates turns on the definition of a 
wrongful conviction and the method of study.  Initially, it’s important to 
distinguish between procedural error (which some have referred to as “legal 
innocence”
 
36) and factual innocence.  The latter means that someone else 
committed the crime, whereas the former penalizes the state for violating a 
defendant’s fundamental rights by overturning the ensuing conviction and, 
in some cases, ordering a new trial.  Joshua Marquis, a district attorney 
from Oregon, has decried the improper usage of “innocence” when 
describing defendants who are released from prison on what some might 
consider a “legal technicality.”  Says Marquis, “To call a man with blood on 
his hands innocent stains not only the truth, but calls into question the 
actual innocence of the fewer number who are truly exonerated.”37
 
33 Borchard, supra note 
 
3. 
34 Dan Simon, Are Wrongful Convictions Episodic or Epidemic?, Paper Presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association (July 7-9, 2006). 
35 See Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, Wrongful Conviction: Perceptions of Criminal 
Justice Professionals Regarding the Frequency of Wrongful Conviction and the Extent of 
System Error, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 436 (2007); see also Michael D. Risinger, Innocents 
Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 768 (2007); Marvin Zalman, Brad Smith & Amy Kiger, Officials’ Estimates 
of the Incidence of “Actual Innocence” Convictions, 25 JUST. Q. 72 (2008). 
36 See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1560. 
37 Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 521 
(2005). 
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In several cases, factual innocence and procedural error coincide, 
when, for example, the constitutional violations that produce procedural 
error also lead to the conviction of a factually innocent person.  But in 
reviewing the literature on error rates, it’s important to keep the two terms 
distinct.38  In 2000, Professor James Liebman and colleagues published 
their research on error rates in capital cases from 1973 to 1995.39  The 
researchers estimated that 68% of capital convictions “were thrown out 
because of serious flaws” in the investigation or prosecution.40  But whereas 
judicial reversal qualifies as at least procedural error, it does not necessarily 
imply factual innocence.  Indeed, the vast majority of capital defendants 
who won on appeal in the study were tried once more, and upon retrial, 
only 5% of the original total were “cleared of the capital offense.”41
Such distinctions should not imply that we disregard cases of 
procedural error, unconcerned, as some might imply, that such “legal 
technicalities” are hardly cause for alarm.  Procedural error is a signal that 
the criminal justice system has failed, but the failure is much more troubling 
when the system convicts a person who is factually innocent.  For this 
reason, much of the research that has sought to estimate the rate of wrongful 
convictions has focused on factual innocence.  Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin 
sought to answer this question by surveying prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
judges, and sheriffs in seven Ohio cities about their familiarity with, and 
estimates of, wrongful convictions.
  Even 
among this group, Liebman and colleagues were not able to identify or 
estimate the number of defendants that were factually innocent. 
42  Out of a sample of nearly two 
hundred participants, approximately 70% estimated that wrongful 
convictions occurred less than 1% of the time, 20% rated the frequency at 
1% to 5% of cases, 2% said errors occurred between 5% and 10% of the 
time, and 6% denied that wrongful convictions occur.43  The weakness in 
this research, of course, is that it merely asks respondents to speculate about 
facts they likely do not know and, thus, reflects only their perceptions about 
the frequency of the problem, not any underlying reality.44
 
38 See Tony G. Poveda, Research Note, Estimating Wrongful Convictions, 18 JUST. Q. 
689, 691 (2001). 
 
39 James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, Capital Attrition: Error Rates in 
Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2000). 
40 Id. at 1852. 
41 Id. 
42 C. Ronald Huff, Arye Rattner & Edward Sagarin, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: 
Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 518 (1986). 
43 Id. at 522. 
44 In their 1996 book Convicted But Innocent, Huff et al. estimated the error rate at 
0.05% (1 out of every 200 convictions).  See HUFF ET AL., supra note 18, at 59-62.  However, 
this estimate reflects the collective speculation of some criminal justice officials in Ohio and 
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A different approach seeks to chronicle the number of known 
exonerations.  Gross and colleagues did just this when, in 2005, they 
published their research recounting 340 exonerations that took place 
between 1989 and 2003.45  But raw numbers alone may not pack the punch 
they warrant, leading some, such as Justice Scalia, to dismiss these figures 
as “fairly modest.”46  Others, including Joshua Marquis, have sought to 
extrapolate from these numbers, arguing that even if the authors understated 
the results by a factor of ten, the data would still represent an error rate of 
just 0.027% in felony convictions.47
One must, of course, appreciate the limits of extrapolation.  As Gross 
notes, more than 95% of the 340 exonerations from 1989 through 2003 that 
he and his colleagues uncovered came primarily from cases of rape and 
murder,
 
48 “which together account for only 2% of felony convictions.”49
 
some state attorneys general: it has no basis in observed fact.  Huff et al. arrived at this figure 
by asking fifty-five Ohio county judges, fifty-three prosecutors, twenty-one public 
defenders, fifty-nine sheriffs and chiefs of police, and forty-one state attorneys general to 
guess into which of four categories the error rate in the system most likely fell (“never,” 
“less than 1%,” “1-5%,” or “6-10%”).  Huff et al. then arbitrarily assigned the final number 
as the midpoint between the two most frequently chosen categories—“never” and “less than 
1%.”  Because this estimate is based on the aggregated guesswork of some criminal justice 
officials, it is not an empirically valid measure of the true error rate in the criminal justice 
system.  See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: 
Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1998).  Two additional 
recent studies have used the same methodology to arrive at equally speculative findings: 
Ramsey and Frank surveyed 798 Ohio criminal justice officials (police, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and judges) and found that they perceived the error rate to be 0.5-1% of all felony 
cases in their county and 1-3% in the United States.  Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, supra 
note 
  
Certainly, there are far more kinds of criminal prosecutions, but “lesser” 
felonies, and certainly misdemeanors, may lack the record and interested 
advocates to investigate and pursue exonerations.  Moreover, the vast 
35.  Zalman, Smith, and Kiger surveyed 467 Michigan criminal justice officials (police, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges) who estimated that wrongful convictions 
occurred less than 0.5% in their own jurisdiction and at a rate of 1-3% in the United States.  
Zalman, Smith & Kiger, supra note 35, at 84.  These findings do not reflect a precise, 
underlying error rate in the real world of criminal justice, as they are essentially collective 
guesswork. 
45 Gross et al., supra note 20. 
46 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 197 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
47 Joshua Marquis, The Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23.  
Marquis has subsequently “refined [his] statistics” to estimate a wrongful conviction rate of 
0.75%.  See http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2008/05/counting-innocent-discussion-
of.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2010). 
48 Gross et al., supra note 20, at 529. 
49 Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 173 
(2008).  
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majority of criminal prosecutions are concluded with guilty pleas, yet 
research offers few glimpses into errors there. 
For this reason, one must be extremely careful when evaluating claims 
such as those of Marquis and Scalia who contend a 0.027% error rate.  As 
Simon explains, their analysis is “flat wrong and badly misleading.  In fact, 
[the error rate is] much higher.”50  The “Scalia-Marquis ratio,” as Simon 
calls it, divides the number of exonerations by the total number of felonies.  
However, the numerator is likely many times larger than Marquis estimates, 
and the denominator is several times smaller than he suggests.  If, as Gross 
reminds us, 95% of known exonerations come from rape and murder 
cases,51 then the denominator used by Marquis should be contracted fifty 
fold to reflect the proportion of rape and murder cases among criminal 
prosecutions as a whole.  Furthermore, almost all exonerations in rape cases 
came from crimes in which the perpetrator and victim were strangers, yet 
stranger rape constitutes less than 30% of rape convictions.52
With respect to the numerator, many of the exonerations to date have 
been based on DNA testing, yet fewer than 20% of violent crimes involve 
biological evidence, and in the vast majority of past cases, biological 
evidence was not properly collected and held for future testing.
  These figures, 
in turn, should further shrink the denominator and thus raise the error rate. 
53  
Erroneous convictions are hardly “limited to cases in which biological 
evidence is available, meaning the number of known exonerations is likely 
a serious underestimate of the actual number of exonerations.”54  To 
address concerns such as these, Michael Risinger conducted a study just 
three years ago in which he sought to match “apples-to-apples,” comparing 
known exonerations in capital rape-murders from the 1980s against a 
relevant denominator of cases.  Although his study was based on a 
relatively small number of exonerations and a series of assumptions, he 
concluded that “a true minimum innocence rate for rape-murder[s] from 
1982-1989” was at least 3.3% and potentially as high as 5%.55  In this 
respect, Risinger’s estimate was higher, but not wildly so, from a study of 
the frequency of wrongful death sentences in which Gross and O’Brien 
calculated a 2.3% capital exoneration rate in cases post 1973.56
In the end, we think there are three conclusions to be made from the 
research on error rates.  First, as Simon suggests, the “true” rate of error in 
 
 
50 Simon, supra note 34. 
51 Gross, supra note 49, at 176. 
52 Simon, supra note 34. 
53 GOULD, supra note 28, at 19. 
54 Id. 
55 Risinger, supra note 35, at 778.  
56 Gross & O’Brien, supra note 4, at 942-47. 
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the criminal justice system is “unknowable.”  However, the research to date 
at least has narrowed the range of estimates.  Second, it is essential that 
observers consider the method of extrapolation made by researchers, for the 
numerator and denominator in such estimates must be comparable.  Third, 
most of what we know concerns errors in the most serious criminal cases—
rapes and murders, and capital trials at that.  Gross points out that errors 
may be less common in “light felonies and misdemeanors,”57 as murder 
cases are harder to investigate and prove, making errors potentially more 
prevalent because police clearance rates are higher.58
B. THE HARMS OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
  But, it could be just 
the opposite, that errors are more common, and more commonly accepted, 
in cases where neither police nor prosecutors have as much time, resources, 
or pressure to investigate cases thoroughly and in which the lesser stakes of 
punishment do not command as many or as zealous advocates to investigate 
cases postconviction.  It is here—where the debate moves from major 
felonies to lesser crimes—that Gross and O’Brien’s admonition is most 
relevant and where future research is especially needed.   
To many observers, the harms of wrongful convictions may seem 
obvious.  So long as the wrong suspect is behind bars, the public remains at 
risk as the actual perpetrator is free to roam the community and prey on 
others.  Taxpayers must commit resources to cover the imprisonment of an 
innocent person.  The public may lose trust in the criminal justice system.  
And, of course, the innocent defendant loses his freedom while forced to 
confront the dangers of imprisonment.  But the harms of erroneous 
prosecutions and convictions go even deeper, a reality that has been brought 
home with a number of studies conducted in the last decade. 
Westervelt and Cook, for example, have interviewed individuals 
exonerated of capital crimes.59  As they concluded, the exonerees’ 
experiences were similar to “life-threatening traumas.”60  Adrian Grounds, 
too, has studied former prisoners, including those exonerated after as many 
as nineteen years in prison.61
 
57 Gross, supra note 
  Like Westervelt and Cook, he concluded that 
“those released following wrongful conviction and imprisonment may have 
significant psychiatric and adjustment difficulties of the kind described in 
49, at 180. 
58 Id. at 178-79. 
59 Saundra D. Westervelt & Kimberly J. Cook, Coping with Innocence After Death Row, 
CONTEXTS, Fall 2008, at 32.  
60 Id. at 35. 
61 Adrian Grounds, Psychological Consequences of Wrongful Conviction and 
Imprisonment, 46 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 165 (2004). 
2010] ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF GETTING IT WRONG? 837 
other groups of people who have suffered chronic psychological trauma.”62  
Although it can be difficult at times to distinguish the needs of exonerees 
from those of any former inmate, Westervelt and Cook provide a virtual 
laundry list of the needs of exonerees that often go unmet.  Tempered with 
the joy of their freedom, exonerees often require assistance finding housing, 
obtaining medical attention, securing employment and training, acquiring 
emergency financial support, managing anger and bitterness, reconnecting 
with family and children, addressing drug or alcohol dependency, 
negotiating social rejection and stigma, expunging their records, and 
seeking a gubernatorial pardon, among other needs.63
Such challenges exist only if the wrongly convicted defendant can 
establish his innocence in the first place and earn his release.  As University 
of Utah law professor Daniel Medwed’s research indicates, however, these 
prospects are hardly assured, especially for the innocent defendant who 
remains behind bars and must seek release through the parole process.
 
64  As 
Medwed explains, it can be inordinately difficult for a defendant to 
convince a parole board that he is “rehabilitated” while maintaining his 
innocence when contrition and accepting responsibility for one’s misdeeds 
is considered to be a vital part of the rehabilitative process.  Insistence on an 
admission of guilt before parole is based upon a mistaken belief that the 
judicial system is infallible and reveals a law enforcement bias towards 
“punishing” those who refuse to confess.65
Even if an innocent defendant can navigate this arduous process and 
secure his release, his prospects of redress are minimal at best.  Those 
scholars who have studied compensation mechanisms for the exonerated are 
effectively unanimous in their conclusion that state compensation 




62 Id. at 178. 
  In 1999, Pace 
Law School professor Adele Bernhard surveyed the field, discovering that 
“only fourteen states, the District of Columbia and the federal government” 
had laws to compensate individuals who had been unjustly convicted and 
63 Westervelt & Cook, supra note 60. 
64 Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to 
Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491 (2008).  
65 Id. at 548. 
66 See Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate 
Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 
703 (2004); Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73 (1999); Jennifer L. Chunias & Yael D. Aufgang, Beyond 
Monetary Compensation: The Need for Comprehensive Services for the Wrongfully 
Convicted, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 105, 106 (2008); Alberto B. Lopez, $10? And a 
Denim Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 
665 (2002). 
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later exonerated.67  Five years later, she repeated the study, anticipating 
that, with “the continuing parade of exonerations . . . local legislatures 
[would have enacted] new statutes benefiting the unjustly convicted. . . .  I 
was wrong,” she reluctantly concluded.68  If anything, “several states [had] 
enacted legislation designed not to assist exonerees in a significant way, but 
only to bestow symbolic token support.”69  Her conclusion is supported by 
Chunias and Aufgang’s 2008 finding that state compensation mechanisms 
for the exonerated “are excessively restrictive in identifying who will be 
compensated, and cap the amount of recovery at artificially low levels.”70  
Furthermore, they say, just three states offer meaningful post-release 
services, such as reentry planning services.71
C. THE SOURCES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
  Quite clearly, the researchers 
collectively conclude, the harms of wrongful conviction are not adequately 
compensated. 
We doubt that Gross and O’Brien would disagree with the preceding 
conclusion.  Their claim is more that research into wrongful convictions has 
been unable to identify the specific circumstances under which cases will 
go awry.  As we explain in the following section, the two are correct that 
the field lacks discrete “causes” of wrongful convictions, but this is hardly 
akin to concluding that we are unaware of the sources of these errors.  To 
the contrary, there have been numerous studies of wrongful convictions 
conducted over the years, many of them identifying the same set of sources.  
Much of this research has been conducted by case study, meaning that 
researchers have examined one or a few cases of wrongful conviction and, 
in narrative form, described the process by which an innocent person was 
convicted.  An excellent example of this genre is Margaret Edds’s book, An 
Expendable Man,72
 
67 Bernhard, When Justice Fails, supra note 
 which describes the harrowing saga of Earl 
Washington, Jr.  Mr. Washington, a man of very low intelligence, came 
within days of his execution before securing a reprieve and his eventual 
exoneration.  In a case of a sensational murder, Washington was essentially 
talked into a confession by law enforcement officers, who should have 
known that he was innocent.  What’s more, Mr. Washington’s trial counsel 
overlooked key evidence that likely would have established his client’s 
innocence at trial.  In 2006, Mr. Washington won a multi-million dollar 
66, at 77. 
68 Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, supra note 66, at 705. 
69 Id. at 706. 
70 Chunias & Aufgang, supra note 66, at 107. 
71 Id. 
72 MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL 
WASHINGTON, JR. (2003). 
2010] ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF GETTING IT WRONG? 839 
civil verdict against the sheriff’s deputies whose bad actions had led to his 
wrongful conviction.73
There are many more examples of works like Edds’s case study, 
including such well-known titles as Guilty Until Proven Innocent,
 
74 A 
Promise of Justice,75 The Innocent Man,76 and Picking Cotton.77  Indeed, 
one of us is responsible for a book like that, chronicling the tragic multiple 
wrongful conviction story of the “Norfolk Four.”78  In that case, four Navy 
sailors were coerced and worn down in multiple lengthy interrogations to 
confess to a rape-murder that they did not commit, and DNA and other case 
evidence conclusively established that another man—who has since 
provided a corroborated confession to the crime—acted alone.  To date, 
each of the four innocent defendants has been released from prison, but 
none has been granted a full pardon.79
In other works, groups of scholars or activists have conducted 
aggregated case studies.  Under this approach, researchers “create a coding 
instrument to classify (demographic, legal, case, outcome) variables found 
in [the cases] and then identify and analyze the patterns, correlations, and 
outcomes that emerge from the aggregated data.”
 
80  Bedau and Radelet’s 
work on wrongful convictions first introduced this method to the field,81 an 
approach that has been replicated by others, including both of us.82
 
73 Editorial, Delayed Justice for Earl Washington, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 10, 2006, at 
B8. 
  
Utilizing pro bono lawyers from major law firms, Innocence Commission 
for Virginia (ICVA) researchers conducted separate case studies of eleven 
known exonerations in Virginia.  Researchers were instructed in the use of 
an investigative instrument, and results were chronicled in both a narrative 
format and also in a spreadsheet.  The Ryan Commission in Illinois used a 
74 DONALD S. CONNERY, GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT (1977). 
75 DAVID PROTESS & ROB WARDEN, A PROMISE OF JUSTICE: THE EIGHTEEN-YEAR FIGHT 
TO SAVE FOUR INNOCENT MEN (1998). 
76 JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN 
(2006). 
77 JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO, RONALD COTTON & ERIN TOMEO, PICKING COTTON: 
OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009). 
78 TOM WELLS & RICHARD LEO, THE WRONG GUYS: MURDER, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND 
THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008). 
79 Norfolk Four, http://www.norfolkfour.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
80 Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning from 
Social Science, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2009). 
81 Bedau & Radelet, supra note 13. 
82 See GOULD, supra note 30; see also Drizin & Leo, supra note 14, at 907; Leo & Ofshe, 
supra note 14. 
840 JON B. GOULD & RICHARD A. LEO [Vol. 100 
similar approach when investigating erroneous convictions in capital 
cases.83
To be sure, neither the ICVA nor the Ryan Commission relied as 
stringently on a coding instrument as would be common in social science 
research, but interestingly, the results from both commissions mirror those 
found in the several other studies of wrongful convictions.
 
84  This repetition 
and replication gives us confidence that, far from anomalies, the sources 
identified in these several studies are commonly found in cases of wrongful 
conviction.  For that matter, the scope of the problem is ever expanding.  
When DNA testing first came upon the scene in the early 1990s, the 
National Institute of Justice commissioned a study of wrongful convictions.  
As mentioned earlier, it found that among rape cases referred to the FBI for 
DNA testing, law enforcement officers had been wrong one out of every 
four times in naming an initial suspect.85
When considering the sources of wrongful convictions, it is important 
to distinguish, first, between correlation and causation, and second, between 
contributing and exclusive sources.  Because much of the research to date 
has been conducted by case study, we are not able to say that the errors 
identified in these cases occur exclusively in wrongful convictions or that 
they are the only errors that may lead an innocent suspect to wrongful 
imprisonment.  For example, the problems of tunnel vision, discussed in a 
section below, are likely prevalent in many criminal cases.
 
86
For this reason, we think it is better to understand the sources of 
wrongful convictions not so much as dichotomous causes—a witness 
correctly or incorrectly identified the defendant and the identification 
directly led the jury to convict—but as contributing factors in a path 
analysis that might have been broken at some point before conviction.  We 
have written about path analysis in detail before,
  What should 
concern us (besides seeking to reduce any common source of error in 
criminal prosecutions) is how tunnel vision was overcome in certain cases 
to prevent wrongful convictions, but continued unchecked in others to 
contribute to mistaken prosecutions and convictions. 
87
 
83 See GOULD, supra note 
 so we do not wish to 
replicate that here.  However, in sum, path analysis is similar to a decision 
tree; one starts with an initial condition regarding a case—say that a crime 
has occurred with eyewitnesses—and then traces the possible progression 
of that case, through investigation and prosecution, under competing 
28, at 37-42. 
84 See, e.g., Bedau & Radelet, supra note 13.  
85 CONNORS ET AL., supra note 24, at xxviii. 
86 See infra Part III.C.1. 
87 See GOULD, supra note 28; Leo & Gould, supra note 80. 
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scenarios.  Among other things, path analysis allows researchers to 
understand better where and how intervening forces shape the movement 
and outcome of a case through the criminal justice process.  For example, 
the discovery of biological evidence in the case above could alter its 
progression depending upon how convincing the eyewitnesses are, how 
wedded detectives are to their initial theory of the case, and how 
experienced and diligent the defense attorneys are. 
Path analysis takes account of the considerable research on the sources 
of wrongful conviction, for, indeed, the very point of a decision tree is to 
understand how an erroneous conviction occurred.  In this respect, the last 
hundred years (and even more important, the prior two decades) have seen 
considerable research uncovering the likely sources of wrongful 
convictions.  Together, this research has identified seven central categories 
of sources, including problems involving (1) mistaken eyewitness 
identification; (2) false confessions; (3) tunnel vision; (4) informant 
testimony; (5) imperfect forensic science; (6) prosecutorial misconduct; and 
(7) inadequate defense representation.  Apart from these primary sources, 
the literature also discusses the potential role of race effects, media effects, 
and the failure of postconviction remedies. 
1. Mistaken Eyewitness Identification 
Nationally, over three-quarters of known wrongful convictions (many 
of them in rape cases) are, in part, the result of mistaken eyewitness 
identifications.88  Eyewitness misidentification is caused by natural 
psychological errors in human judgment.  As Gary Wells and colleagues 
have ably noted, stress alters people’s perception of an event.  When 
confronted with a gun or other weapon during a violent crime, for example, 
the victim may focus so heavily on the firearm that he or she cannot take in 
and remember well the details of the perpetrator.89  This problem is 
pronounced when the victim and perpetrator are of different races.90
 
88 BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO 
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 95 (2000).  In fact, 
Gross and colleagues estimate that as many as 88% of wrongful rape convictions nationwide 
may have been based in large part on misidentifications.  Gross et al., supra note 
  
Victims may believe that they recall the events accurately—the crime 
ostensibly “stenciled into their minds”—but research indicates that there is 
45, at 530. 
89 Gary L. Wells & Donna M. Murray, What Can Psychology Say about the Neil v. 
Biggers Criteria for Judging Eyewitness Accuracy?, 68 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347, 349-50 
(1983). 
90 Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating Own-Race 
Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analysis, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3 (2001). 
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little relationship between an eyewitness’s certainty of her identification 
and the accuracy of that report.91
Eyewitness identifications can be influenced by the suggestiveness of 
the identification process, which “leads eyewitnesses to distort their reports 
of the witnessing experience across a broad array of questions.”
 
92  In 
practice, suggestion can enter the identification process in two ways.  First, 
law enforcement officers or other observers can confirm a witness’s 
identification, whether at the time of the identification procedure or at any 
point before in-court identification.93  This can be as subtle as an officer 
praising the witness for a “good job” in her identification or as overt as a 
detective thanking the witness “for confirming our suspicion.”  The 
problem with such suggestions is that they can give witnesses false 
confidence in their identifications, even if the witnesses are mistaken.  
Moreover, witnesses too rarely recognize that a reinforcing comment 
inflated their confidence.94
Law enforcement officers may also employ suggestive identification 
procedures that make the suspect stand out from others.  For example, in the 
case of Marvin Anderson, Anderson’s photograph appeared in color while 
the other photographs in the array were black-and-white.
 
95  A further 
example is lineups, in which problems have arisen when the suspect is the 
only person presented of a particular height, hair color, or complexion 
among a group of six or more.  These frailties may lead witnesses to make 
“relative judgments,” subtly encouraging them to select the individual in an 
identification procedure who looks most like the offender rather than 
employing independent judgment to ensure that the individual identified is 
the actual perpetrator.96  Often, someone in a lineup or photo array looks 
more like the actual offender than the others present do, and witnesses, in 
turn, may be tempted to identify that person.97
 
91 Wells & Murray, supra note 
  Additionally, any initial 
mistaken identification may further reinforce subsequent reports, because 
89, at 351.  
92 Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, Good, You Identified the Suspect: Feedback to 
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
360, 367 (1998). 
93 Id. at 366-67. 
94 Wells & Murray, supra note 89, at 357-58. 
95 GOULD, supra note 28, at 144.  
96 Gary L. Wells, Theory, Logic and Data: Paths to a More Coherent Eyewitness 
Science, 22 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 853, 854-55 (2008). 
97 See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for 
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 615-16 (1998) (explaining that in 
the absence of the actual perpetrator, witnesses tend to identify an innocent person who 
looks more like the perpetrator than other individuals in the lineup); Gary L. Wells, The 
Psychology of Line Up Identifications, 14 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 89 (1984). 
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eyewitnesses may confuse or replace their memory of the true perpetrator 
with the image of the person who looked most like the offender in the 
identification procedure.98
Given documented problems such as these, U.S. Attorney General 
Janet Reno commissioned a group of criminal justice professionals in the 
late 1990s to address and recommend guidelines for police identification 
procedures.  Published by the National Institute of Justice in 1999,
 
99 the 
state of New Jersey has adopted these recommendations, and the guidelines 
provide the basis for best practices in law enforcement agencies around the 
country.100  Among these best practices, researchers recommend that 
witnesses be shown photographs or individuals in a lineup sequentially—
that is, one at a time—rather than simultaneously as a group.101  
Researchers also recommend that witnesses be asked to determine, upon 
looking at each photograph or individual, whether the witness recognizes 
the perpetrator.  In an analysis of twenty-five studies comparing 
simultaneous and sequential identification procedures, scholars have 
estimated that sequential procedures can reduce the chances of a mistaken 
identification by nearly one-half.102
 
98 GOULD, supra note 30, at 137. 
  Perhaps most important, identification 
procedures must be administered “double-blind” so that neither the 
eyewitness nor the person administering the lineup knows the identity of the 
prime suspect and thus cannot guess about or hint at the correctness of the 
identification.  In this way, suggestion and feedback effects can be 
minimized. 
99 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A 
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999) [hereinafter EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE GUIDE]. 
100 See Gary Wells & Elizabeth Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 
277, 286 (2003). 
101 EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE GUIDE, supra note 99, at 9.  
102 Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous 
Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459 (2001).  
One study by the Chicago Police Department in 2006 suggests otherwise, concluding that 
sequential lineups have a higher error rate and lead to fewer identifications as a whole than 
do simultaneous lineups.  However, subsequent analysis of the study showed that it was not 
double blind (because officers who knew the “correct” suspect were in the room for 
simultaneous but not sequential lineups) and thus had not properly controlled for the 
suggestion effects.  David Feige, Witnessing Guilt, Ignoring Innocence?, N.Y. TIMES, June 
6, 2006, at A21; see also Shirley N. Glaze, Selecting the Guilty Perpetrator: An Examination 
of the Effectiveness of Sequential Lineups, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 199, 204-07 (2007). 
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2. False Confessions 
It is difficult for the public to understand why someone would confess 
to a crime that the individual did not commit,103 but research not only 
indicates that false confessions occur but also explains how they happen.104  
Several studies of erroneous prosecutions conducted since 1987 have shown 
that anywhere from 14% to 25% of the cases reviewed involved false 
confessions.105  According to the national Innocence Project, approximately 
two-thirds of the DNA exonerations in homicide cases involved false 
confessions.106  This is consistent with Warden’s finding that approximately 
60% of wrongful homicide convictions in Illinois since 1970 involved false 
confessions.  Moreover, false confessions when introduced into evidence at 
trial usually lead to the conviction of the innocent.107
There is no one cause, logic, or type of false confession.  Rather, 
police-induced false confessions are the product of a multiple step process 





103 See Iris Blandon-Gitlin, Katheryn Sperry & Richard Leo, Jurors Believe 
Interrogation Tactics Are Not Likely to Elicit False Confessions: Will Expert Witness 
Testimony Inform Them Otherwise?, PSYCHOL, CRIME & L. (forthcoming 2010); Danielle E. 
Chojnacki, Michael E. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, An Empirical Basis For the 
Admission Of Expert Testimony On False Confessions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 39 (2008); Mark 
Costanzo, Netta Shaked-Schroer & Katherine Vinson, Juror Beliefs About Police 
Interrogations, False Confessions, and Expert Testimony, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 231 
(2010); Lisa A. Henkel, Kimberly A.J. Coffman & Elizabeth M. Dailey, A Survey of 
People’s Attitudes and Beliefs About False Confessions, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 555, 560 
(2008); Richard A. Leo & Brittany Liu, What Do Potential Jurors Know About Police 
Interrogation Techniques and False Confessions?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 381, 383 (2009). 
  Under certain conditions of interrogation, police 
are more likely to elicit false confessions, and certain types of individuals 
are more vulnerable to interrogation pressure and, thus, are more easily 
manipulated into giving false confessions.  In order to understand why 
innocent suspects sometimes make false confessions, first we must look at 
the process through which police investigators identify criminal suspects 
104 RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 195-236 (2008). 
105 Id. at 244; see also Innocence Project, False Confessions, www.innocenceproject.org/ 
understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
106 WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION 
PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 225 (2003). 
107 In two studies, innocent false confessors whose cases went to trial were convicted 73-
81% of the time.  See Drizin & Leo, supra note 14, at 996; Leo & Ofshe, supra note 14 at 
482. 
108 Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: 
The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 
189, 191-92 (1997). 
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and how police interrogation works as a psychological process, both in the 
pre-admission and post-admission stages of interrogation. 
Three errors occur in sequence when police elicit a false confession 
that leads to a wrongful conviction.  The first error occurs when detectives 
mistakenly classify an innocent person as guilty.  As Davis and Leo point 
out, “once specific suspects are targeted, police interviews and 
interrogations are thereafter guided by the presumption of guilt.”109
Although many cognitive errors lead police to mistakenly classify an 
innocent person as a guilty suspect, perhaps the most common errors are the 
product of their investigative training.  Police officers in the United States 
are erroneously taught that they can learn to become human lie detectors, 
able to distinguish truth from deception at extraordinarily high rates of 
accuracy.
  
Whether to interrogate is arguably the most critical decision point in the 
investigative process.  Police only elicit false confessions if they 
erroneously interrogate innocent people.  If all the suspects the police 
interrogated were, in fact, guilty, they would never elicit false confessions 
from the innocent.  Misclassifying innocent suspects is thus both the first 
and the most consequential error police interrogators make. 
110  For example, detectives are taught that the following behaviors 
are symptomatic of deceptive, and thus guilty, suspects: averting one’s 
gaze, slouching, shifting body posture, touching one’s nose, adjusting or 
cleaning one’s glasses, chewing one’s fingernails, and stroking the back of 
one’s head.  Suspects who are guarded, uncooperative, and offer broad 
denials and qualified responses are also believed to be lying and thus guilty.  
However, across a variety of contexts, social science studies have 
repeatedly shown that individuals are highly prone to error in their 
judgments about whether an individual is lying or telling the truth and, thus, 
are poor human lie detectors.  Studies show that most people accurately 
make these types of judgments at rates no better than the flip of a coin.111  
Moreover, studies have suggested that police interrogators themselves 
cannot accurately distinguish between truthful and false denials of guilt at 
levels greater than chance but, instead, routinely make erroneous judgments 
when trying to separate the innocent from the guilty.112
 
109 Deborah Davis & Richard A. Leo, Strategies for Preventing False Confessions and 
Their Consequences, in PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS AND 
PROSECUTIONS 123 (Mark Kebbell & Graham Davies eds., 2006). 
 
110 The Chicago-based firm Reid and Associates, for example, claims that detectives can 
learn to accurately discriminate truth and deception 85% of the time though this rate seems 
to be represented in their training seminars as 100%.  See LEO, supra note 104, at 98.  
111 Id. 
112 Maria Hartwig et al., Police Officers’ Lie Detection Accuracy: Interrogating Freely 
Versus Observing Video, 7 POLICE Q. 429, 430-31 (2004); Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. 
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Once detectives misclassify an innocent person as a guilty suspect, the 
next step is to subject him to an accusatorial interrogation.  Obtaining a 
confession becomes especially important when there is little or no other 
evidence against the suspect—especially in high-profile cases in which 
police detectives are under great pressure to solve the crime113—and 
typically no credible evidence exists against an innocent suspect who police 
erroneously believe is guilty.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the vast majority of 
documented false confession cases occur in homicides and high profile 
cases.114
The primary cause of police-induced false confessions is the use of 
psychologically coercive police interrogation methods.
 
115  These include 
methods that were once identified with the old “third degree,” such as 
deprivation (of food, sleep, water, or access to bathroom facilities, for 
example), incommunicado interrogation, and extreme induced exhaustion 
and fatigue.  Since the 1940s, however, these techniques have become rare 
in domestic police interrogations.  Instead, when today’s police 
interrogators employ psychologically coercive techniques, they usually 
consist of implicit or explicit promises of leniency and implicit or explicit 
threats of harsher treatment in combination with other interrogation 
techniques such as accusation, repetition, attacks on denials, and false 
evidence ploys.116
 
Fong, “I’m Innocent!” Effects of Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the 
Interrogation Room, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499, 500-01 (1999). 
  Even in the absence of promises of leniency or threats of 
harm, police interrogation may become psychologically coercive if it leads 
the interrogated suspect to perceive that he has no choice but to comply 
with the demands of his interrogators.  Contemporary psychological 
interrogation can easily become coercive for multiple reasons.  The 
custodial environment and physical confinement are intended to isolate and 
disempower the suspect.  Interrogation also is designed to be stressful and 
unpleasant, and of course, the more intensely it proceeds and the longer it 
lasts, the more stressful and unpleasant it will become.  Interrogation 
techniques are meant to cause the suspect to perceive that his guilt has been 
established with complete certainty, that therefore no one will believe his 
denials of guilt or assertions of innocence, and that he will only make his 
situation (and the ultimate outcome of the case against him) much worse if 
he continues to deny the detectives’ accusations.  The suspect may comply 
with the detectives’ wishes because he is fatigued, worn down, or simply 
113 See Gross, supra note 16, at 478-79 (demonstrating the intense pressure police 
experience when a case involves a heinous crime and/or is public). 
114 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 14, at 938-39; Gross et al., supra note 45, at 531. 
115 See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 108, at 214-20; see also LEO supra note 104, at 229-31. 
116 LEO, supra note 104, at 155-62. 
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sees no other way to escape an intolerably stressful experience.  Commonly, 
suspects who falsely confess believe that they will only be able to leave if 
they do what the detectives say.  Other suspects comply because they are 
led to believe that it is the only way to avoid a feared outcome (not being 
able to see their young children again or going to prison for life instead of 
just a few years).  When a suspect perceives that he has no choice but to 
comply, his confession is coerced and involuntary.117
Although psychological coercion is the primary cause of police-
induced false confessions, individuals differ in their ability to withstand 
interrogation pressure and, therefore, in their vulnerability to giving false 
confessions.
 
118  Individuals who are highly suggestible or compliant are 
more likely to confess falsely.  So too are the developmentally disabled, 
cognitively impaired, juveniles, and the mentally ill—all of whom tend to 
be unusually suggestible and compliant.  The developmentally disabled are 
more likely to confess falsely for a variety of reasons.119
 
117 Ofshe & Leo, supra note 
  Youth is also a 
108, at 214-20; see also LEO, supra note 104, at 229-31. 
118 GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A 
HANDBOOK 332-59 (2003). 
119 This is due to their subnormal intellectual functioning, resulting in low intelligence, a 
short attention span, poor memory, and poor conceptual and communication skills.  They do 
not always understand statements made to them or the implications of the answers they give.  
Often, these people lack the ability to think in a causal way about the consequences of their 
actions.  Their limited intellectual intelligence translates into a limited social intelligence as 
well, and consequently they do not always fully comprehend the context or complexity of 
certain social interactions or situations.  This is especially relevant when in a particularly 
adversarial situation such as a police interrogation.  Under interrogation, they are not likely 
to understand that the police detective who appears to be friendly is really their adversary or 
to comprehend the long-term consequences of making an incriminating statement.  The 
developmentally disabled are highly suggestible and easy to manipulate.  They also lack self-
confidence, possess poor problem-solving abilities, and have tendencies to mask or disguise 
their cognitive deficits.  Exacerbating the problem, the developmentally disabled tend to look 
to others—particularly authority figures—for appropriate cues to behavior.  It is therefore 
easy to get them to agree with and repeat back false or misleading statements, even 
incriminating ones.  See LEO supra note 104, at 231-34. 
 Additionally—as many researchers have noted—the developmentally disabled are eager 
to please.  They are prone to being acquiescent due to their high need for approval.  They 
compensate for their cognitive disability by learning to submit to the demands of others, 
even more so from authority figures.  Because of this desire to please, they are easily 
influenced and led to comply in situations of conflict.  Some observers refer to this as 
“biased responding,” where the developmentally disabled answer affirmatively when they 
perceive a response to be desirable and negatively when they perceive it to be undesirable.  
They will answer the person questioning them with what they believe he or she wants to 
hear.  Similarly, the developmentally disabled exhibit the “cheating to lose” syndrome: they 
eagerly assume blame or knowingly provide incorrect answers in order to please and seek 
the approval of an authority figure.  It is easy to see how their compliance and 
submissiveness can lead the developmentally disabled to make false confessions during 
police interrogations.  Id. 
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significant risk factor for police-induced false confessions.120  Finally, 
people with mental illness are also disproportionately likely to falsely 
confess,121 especially in response to accusatorial police pressure.122
The use of psychologically coercive police methods (and how they 
interact with an individual’s personality) usually explains how and why 
interrogation succeeds in moving an innocent suspect from denial to 
admission.  But a confession consists not only of an “I did it” statement but 
 
 
 Because of their cognitive disabilities and learned coping behaviors, the smallest amount 
of stress may overwhelm the developmentally disabled.  They simply lack the psychological 
ability to withstand the level of pressure, distress, and anxiety that normal individuals can.  
As a result, they tend to avoid conflict, and situations that produce ordinary levels of stress—
which is far below that felt in an accusatorial police interrogation—are overwhelming to 
them.  They are therefore less likely to resist the pressures of confrontational police 
questioning and more likely to comply with the demands of their accusers, even if this 
results in making a false confession.  The breaking point at which they are willing to falsely 
tell a detective what he wants to hear in order to escape an aversive interrogation is often 
much lower than that for a mentally normal individual, especially in prolonged 
interrogations.  In recent years, there have been numerous documented cases of false 
confessions from the developmentally disabled.  Id. 
120 Young children and adolescents also share many of the character traits that are 
present in the developmentally disabled.  Juveniles especially are highly compliant to 
authoritative figures and tend to be immature, naïve, acquiescent, and eager to please.  Thus, 
they are predisposed to be submissive when questioned by police.  Such youth are also 
highly suggestible and, like the developmentally disabled, are easily pressured and 
persuaded to make false incriminating statements, especially when questioned by police.  
They lack the cognitive capacity to fully grasp the gravity of a police interrogation and 
cannot comprehend the long-term consequences of their actions.  Juveniles, like the 
developmentally disabled, also have limited language skills, memory, attention span, and 
information-processing abilities compared to normal adults and are less capable of 
withstanding interpersonal stress, and thus more likely to perceive aversive interrogation as 
intolerable.  See id. 
121 Allison D. Redlich, Mental Illness, Police Interrogations, and the Potential for False 
Confession, 55 LAW & PSYCHIATRY 19 (2004). 
122 The mentally ill possess a range of psychiatric symptoms that make them more likely 
to agree with, suggest, or confabulate false and misleading information to detectives during 
police interrogations.  Such symptoms include faulty reality monitoring, proneness to 
feelings of guilt, distorted perceptions and beliefs, an inability to distinguish fact from 
fantasy, heightened anxiety, mood disturbances, and a lack of self-control.  Additionally, the 
mentally ill may suffer from deficits in executive functioning, attention, and memory, may 
become easily confused, and may lack social skills such as assertiveness.  These traits 
increase the risk of falsely confessing.  While the mentally ill are likely to make voluntary 
false confessions, they also may be easily coerced into making compliant ones.  As Salas 
points out, “[m]ental illness makes people suggestible and susceptible to the slightest form of 
pressure; coercion can take place much more easily, and in situations that a ‘normal’ person 
might not find coercive.”  Claudio Salas, Note, The Case For Excluding the Criminal 
Confessions of the Mentally Ill, 16 YALE J.L. & HUM. 243, 264 (2004).  Thus, “the mentally 
ill are especially vulnerable either to giving false confessions or to misunderstanding the 
context of their confessions, thus making statements against their own best interests that an 
average criminal suspect would not make.”  Id. at 274.  
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also of a subsequent narrative—what researchers have referred to as the 
post-admission narrative123—that contextualizes and attempts to explain the 
“I did it” statement, transforming the admission into a confession.  A 
detailed post-admission narrative is what makes the story appear to be a 
compelling account of the suspect’s guilt.  The content and structure of a 
suspect’s post-admission narrative goes a long way toward explaining why 
confessions are treated as such powerful evidence of guilt and sometimes 
lead to the wrongful conviction of the innocent.124
Police detectives use the post-admission phase of interrogation to 
influence, shape, and sometimes even script the suspect’s narrative.  The 
detective’s ultimate objective is to elicit a persuasive account of what 
happened that successfully incriminates the suspect and leads to his 
conviction.  For example, in false confession cases interrogators have 
sometimes invented, suggested, or elicited an account of the suspect’s 
motivation.  They often use scenario-based inducements as a method of 
attributing a minimizing motive to the suspect—which the suspect agrees to 
and then repeats back, even if it is completely inaccurate, because he comes 
to believe that it will reduce his culpability.  Police interrogators will also 
encourage suspects to attribute their decision to confess to an act of 
conscience, to express remorse about committing the crime, and to provide 
vivid scene details that appear to corroborate the suspect’s guilty 
knowledge and thus confirm his culpability.  In addition, interrogators will 
try to make the admission appear to be voluntarily given, portraying the 




Police detectives help create false confessions in the post-admission 
narrative phase of interrogation by pressuring the suspect to accept a 
particular account and suggesting crime facts to him, thereby contaminating 
the suspect’s post-admission narrative.  Unless the suspect has learned the 
crime scene facts from the media, community gossip, or overheard 
conversations, an innocent person will not know either the mundane or the 




123 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 
  Absent such contamination, the innocent 
suspect’s post-admission narrative should therefore be replete with errors 
when responding to questions for which the answers cannot easily be 
guessed by chance.  Unless, of course, the answers are implied, suggested, 
or explicitly provided to the suspect—which, unfortunately, does occur in 
14, at 496. 
124 LEO, supra note 104, at 165-94. 
125 See id. 
126 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 14, at 438-40. 
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many false confession cases.127
Although police training is important in identifying and thus avoiding 
an erroneous confession, research indicates that electronically recording 
interrogations can minimize the likelihood that a false confession will lead 
to a wrongful conviction.
  When an interrogation is recorded, it may 
be possible to trace, step by step, how and when the interrogator implied or 
suggested the correct answers for the suspect to incorporate into his post-
admission narrative.  However, when the interrogation is not recorded—and 
the interrogations preceding virtually all of the documented false confession 
cases have not been recorded—then there may be no objective way to prove 
the interrogator contaminated the suspect’s post-admission narrative.  The 
contamination of the suspect’s post-admission narrative is thus the third 
mistake in the trilogy of police errors that, cumulatively, lead to the 
elicitation and construction of a suspect’s false confession. 
128  Not only are law enforcement officers more 
careful in interrogating suspects when they know a jury may view the 
proceedings—abstaining from threats, punishment, or undue coaching—
jurors also can evaluate the circumstances of the interrogation to determine 
the accuracy of the witness’s statements.129  In the case of Earl Washington, 
Jr., for example, a videotape would have shown officers holding up a key 
piece of evidence for Washington to describe rather than creating the 
impression at trial that Washington had freely described a secret piece of 
evidence known only to the perpetrator.  For that matter, electronic 
recording presents advantages for law enforcement officers who conduct 
proper interrogations.  Videotaped evidence can be quite compelling for 
jurors, and there is reason to believe that suspects are more likely to plead 
guilty to a crime when a properly administered interrogation shows them 
confessing to the crime.  Such evidence also may stave off meritless civil 
suits when judges and jurors can see for themselves how officers behaved 
in the interrogation room.  It is no wonder that surveys of officers using 
videotape find that many “enthusiastically support this practice.”130
 
127 See Richard Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal 
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479; see also Brandon Garrett, 
The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2010). 
 
128 See LEO, supra note 104, at 291-305; see also Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic 
Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1127, 1128-30 (2005). 
129 Of course, the entire interrogation procedure must be recorded so that officers are not 
just “cherry-picking” those examples most helpful to their cause. 
130 Sullivan, supra note 128, at 1128. 
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3. Tunnel Vision 
Like any of us, police officers and prosecutors are susceptible to tunnel 
vision.  That is, the more law enforcement practitioners become convinced 
of a conclusion—in this case, a suspect’s guilt—the less likely they are to 
consider alternative scenarios that conflict with this conclusion.  As Findley 
and Scott explain more comprehensively, when criminal justice 
professionals “focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will 
‘build a case’ for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that 
points away from guilt,”131
Tunnel vision can occur at any point in the criminal justice process.
 they are at risk of “locking on” to the wrong 
suspect and inadvertently leading to his continued prosecution and 
conviction. 
132  
An officer may be so convinced of an eyewitness’s identification that he 
ignores other case facts that point away from the suspect’s guilt; a forensic 
scientist may conduct a hair comparison and see such a close match 
between that of the perpetrator and a suspect that he overlooks fingerprint 
analysis that isn’t as compelling; a prosecutor may be so satisfied with a 
suspect’s confession that he discounts forensic evidence that inculpates 
others; or a defense lawyer may consider the prosecution’s case so airtight 
that he doesn’t bother to look deeper into the government’s files.  Any of 
these possibilities may explain why innocent individuals are named as 
suspects and prosecuted all the way to a conviction.  These are not just 
theoretical possibilities; the many case studies of wrongful convictions 
show these errors are real and have grievous consequences.133
4. Informant Testimony 
 
Watch a “B movie” late at night and you stand a good chance of seeing 
the proverbial scene in a courtroom drama in which a police informant takes 
the stand to inculpate the defendant in the crime.  “The defendant whispered 
to me over breakfast that he had committed the crime and hidden the 
money,” the police “snitch” may utter.  Although such scenes may make for 
mild entertainment, the reality is that a number of wrongful convictions 
have turned on the testimony of police informants who themselves lied for 
personal gain.  As scholars note, informants are often rewarded without 
 
131 Keith Findley & Michael Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292. 
132 See Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do with It?: A Commentary on 
Wrongful Convictions and Rationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1315. 
133 See GOULD, supra note 28. 
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regard to the accuracy and reliability of their information,134 with as many 
as one-fifth of wrongful conviction cases based on snitches that lied.135  A 
classic case is that of Jeffrey Cox in Virginia.  Cox’s conviction for 
abduction and murder was made largely on the testimony of two witnesses, 
whose prior felony convictions and pending charges were not disclosed to 
the defense.  Each of these facts would have undermined the credibility of 
the witnesses, but instead of sharing this information with the defense, the 
prosecution vouched for the veracity of both witnesses in its closing 
argument.136  As a federal appellate judge has said of informant testimony, 
the government relies too heavily on witnesses who are “rewarded 
criminals,” which compromises both the accuracy and the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system.  “Because the government decides whether and 
when to use such witnesses, and what, if anything, to give them for their 
service, the government . . . can either contribute to or eliminate the 
problem,” the judge notes.137 
5. Forensic Science 
Given the rise and wide acceptance of DNA testing, it is possible to 
forget that, for decades, law enforcement had to rely on much less accurate 
forensic methods.  Perhaps the most famous practice is fingerprinting, a 
method so common that applicants for many sensitive jobs have had to 
submit to a series of fingerprints.  But evidence is now mounting about the 
problems with fingerprinting analysis138—which include a lack of validity 
testing and an absence of validated standards for declaring a match139—and 
in a recent Maryland case a trial judge ruled that latent fingerprint 
identification is not sufficiently reliable to be admissible into evidence.140  
The substance behind this conclusion was bolstered by a recent National 
 
134 See Clifford Zimmerman, From the Jailhouse to the Courthouse: The Role of 
Informants in Wrongful Convictions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED, supra note 15, at 72. 
135 See Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful 
Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107 (2006). 
136 GOULD, supra note 28, at 96. 
137 Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1382 (1996). 
138 See James E. Starrs, There’s Something About Novel Scientific Evidence, 28 SW. U. L. 
REV. 417 (1999); see also SIMON COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING 
AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2003). 
139 Jennifer Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a 
Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROB. & RISK 127, 129 (2008). 
140 In Maryland v. Rose, No. K06-0545, mem. op. at 31 (Balt. County Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 
2007), the trial court held that the ACE-V method of latent fingerprint identification was “a 
subjective, untested, unverifiable identification procedure that purports to be infallible”.  See 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
PATH FORWARD 105 n.78 (2009). 
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Research Council report on forensic evidence that echoed Haber and 
Haber’s conclusion141 that “we have reviewed the available scientific 
evidence of the validity of the ACE-V method [of latent fingerprint 
identification] and found none.”142
Fingerprint analysis is hardly the most questionable forensic method 
employed.  More troubling is hair comparison analysis, in which hairs 
found at a crime scene are compared under a microscope to those of a 
possible suspect.  Although hair comparison analysis has passed the Frye
  
143 
and Daubert standards in many courts and has been admitted into evidence, 
more recent research raises considerable doubts about its accuracy.144  For 
example, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Laboratory 
Proficiency Testing Program, involving over 235 crime laboratories 
throughout the United States, found hair comparison analysis to be the 
weakest of all forensic laboratory techniques tested, with error rates as high 
as 67% on individual samples, and the majority of laboratories reaching 
incorrect results on four out of five hair samples analyzed.  Another study 
found that hair comparison error rates dropped from 30% to 4% when 
common hair comparison methods, which compare a questioned hair to the 
hair samples of a suspect, were changed to a “lineup” method, in which 
examiners compare a hair sample from the crime scene to samples from five 
potential suspects.145
Another potentially problematic test has been serology analysis, which 
seeks to establish the probability that a perpetrator and suspect share the 
same blood type.  By contrast to DNA testing, serology analysis does not 
specifically identify suspects, but jurors may not appreciate this fact, 
hearing testimony of similar blood types as proof of identity “with as much 
definitiveness as science can muster.”
 
146
DNA testing has helped to uncover the frailties of forensic methods 
used previously.  This said, DNA is not a panacea.  There is always the 
  Of course, that is no longer the 
case. 
 
141 Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Scientific Validation of Fingerprint Evidence 
Under Daubert, 7 LAW, PROB. & RISK 87 (2008). 
142 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 140, at 136-45.  
143 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that scientific 
evidence is admissible if the technique is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant 
scientific community). 
144 See Larry S. Miller, Procedural Bias in Forensic Science Examinations of Human 
Hair, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 157 (1987); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Hair 
Analysis: The Case Against the Underemployment of Scientific Evidence, 39 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 41 (1982). 
145 GOULD, supra note 28, at 176. 
146 Andre A. Moenssens, Foreword, Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some 
Words of Caution, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 13 (1993). 
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small probability that the results will be inaccurate, but more importantly, 
few crime scenes have sufficient, specific biological evidence for DNA 
analysis.  A robber may never touch a victim nor shed hairs or other 
biological markers in a spot specific to himself.147
Apart from the inherent weaknesses of various forms of forensic 
evidence, there have been several shocking examples of improper, indeed 
shoddy, laboratory practices and forensic testimony that have led to the 
conviction of innocent defendants.
  As a result, law 
enforcement must usually rely on other evidence, including different forms 
of forensic analysis that carry with them greater risks of inaccuracy. 
148  The problem is so serious that the 
National Research Council concluded in 2009 that “the forensic science 
system [in the United States is] fragmented and the quality of practice 
uneven. . . .  These shortcomings pose a threat to the quality and credibility 
of forensic science practice and its service to the justice system.”149
6. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
For the most part, American prosecutors conduct themselves ethically, 
seeking to mete out justice even if it means dismissing charges against a 
defendant whose criminality they suspect but cannot establish.  Still, 
prosecutors may engage in overly suggestive witness coaching,150 offer 
inappropriate and incendiary closing arguments,151
 
147 People are constantly shedding hairs or skin cells, but unless this occurs in a private 
space where the biological markers can be referenced only to the perpetrator, it is impossible 
for forensic analysis to “make a match.” 
 or fail to disclose critical 
evidence to the defense, all of which may raise the prospect of a wrongful 
conviction.  In research on wrongful convictions, the most commonly 
established transgression is the prosecution’s failure to turn over 
exculpatory evidence.  Sometimes police officers do not provide 
prosecutors with this evidence in order to make it available to the defense, 
148 Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and 
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009).  See also Adam Liptak and Ralph 
Blumenthal, New Doubt Cast on Testing in Houston Police Crime Lab, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 
2004; Debra Weiss, NC Report: State Crime Lab Withheld or Overstated Evidence in 230 
Cases, ABA J., Aug. 19, 2010. 
149 “Badly Fragmented” Forensic Science System Needs Overhaul; Evidence to Support 
Reliability of Many Techniques is Lacking (2009), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/ 
onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12589 (last visited August 30, 2010), citing NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 140. 
150 See Bennett L. Gershman, Effective Screening For Truth Telling: Is It Possible? 
Witness Coaching By Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 829 (2002). 
151 Andrea Elliott & Benjamin Weiser, When Prosecutors Err, Others Pay the Price; 
Disciplinary Action Is Rare After Misconduct or Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, at 
N25. 
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or prosecutors may not be aware that they have such information in their 
files.  In other cases, though, the misdeeds are intentional. 
Consider the case of Edward Honaker, a man convicted for rape on the 
basis of testimony from the victim and her boyfriend.  The prosecution 
never turned over an officer’s report that the victim had not been “allowed 
to clearly see the [perpetrator] during the entire sequence of events,” nor, 
more incredulously, did it reveal that the victim and her boyfriend were 
hypnotized four months after the crime, at which time they first identified 
Honaker’s photo as that of the rapist.152  Instead, the prosecution’s 
witnesses were permitted to testify at trial, identifying Honaker, without the 
defense aware that there were good grounds to doubt any identification.  In 
cases like these, it is easy to see how the prosecution’s failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence that is material153
7. Inadequate Defense Representation 
 can lead to a wrongful conviction. 
Even if prosecutors fail in their duties, we expect a suspect’s attorney 
to zealously investigate and defend his case.  As Professor Bernhard 
explains, “[i]t [is] the defense counsel’s responsibility to protect [the 
innocent] from the mistakes of others: from witnesses’ misidentifications, 
police officers’ rush to judgment, and prosecution’s reluctance to reveal 
potentially exculpatory material.”154  Yet, as a Columbia University study 
of capital appeals has found, ineffective defense lawyering was the biggest 
contributing factor to the wrongful conviction or death sentence of criminal 
defendants in capital cases over a twenty-three-year period.155  The central 
reason behind ineffective representation is inadequate funding, an absence 
of quality control, and a lack of motivation.156  The attorney may be so 
rushed that he fails to communicate with his client or communicates “in a 
dismissive, callous or hurried manner.”157
 
152 GOULD, supra note 
  He may make perfunctory 
attempts at discovery, if any; engage in a narrow or shallow investigation; 
neglect to retain needed experts or test physical evidence; fail to prepare for 
trial; or offer “weak trial advocacy and superficial or tentative cross-
28, at 104. 
153 See e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963). 
154 Adele Bernhard, Effective Assistance of Counsel, in WRONGLY CONVICTED, supra 
note 15, at 227-28. 
155 Liebman, Fagan & West, supra note 39. 
156 AD HOC INNOCENCE COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, ACHIEVING 
JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY (2006); Bernhard, supra note 154. 
157 Sheila Martin Berry, Bad Lawyering: How Defense Attorneys Help Convict the 
Innocent, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 487, 490 (2003). 
856 JON B. GOULD & RICHARD A. LEO [Vol. 100 
examination.”158
8. Interrelated Themes 
  The result is a cascade of errors that dilutes or even 
destroys the barrier provided by an effective advocate between an innocent 
defendant and a wrongful conviction. 
Although the factors just discussed are those that appear most often in 
research on the sources of wrongful conviction, three other issues merit 
mention for, if not definitive sources, they serve as either background 
influences or interrelated factors.  These include questions of race, 
inadequate postconviction remedies, and the role of the media.  Any student 
of the criminal justice system recognizes that there are serious race effects 
in the identification, prosecution, and sentencing of criminal suspects.  
Racial and ethnic minorities are disproportionately more likely than whites 
to be stopped and arrested by the police,159 and once convicted, they are 
also more likely to receive longer prison terms than do whites.160  They are 
also more likely to be subject to some of the sources that lead to wrongful 
convictions.161  The clearest example is mistaken eyewitness identification, 
in which the research indicates that errors are more likely when the victim 
and perpetrator are of different races.  In the cases studied, the most 
common pattern of error is when a white victim is raped by an African-
American or Hispanic man and unintentionally identifies an innocent 
person as the perpetrator.  Another area of concern is jury decision-making; 
in a number of cases, all-white juries have erroneously convicted African-
American men based on questionable evidence and with scant 
deliberation.162
Once convicted, innocent defendants often find it extremely arduous to 
establish their blamelessness.  Legal doctrine makes such showings difficult 
to prove, for in throwing out a conviction and, in some cases, ordering a 
  To be sure, these problems are hardly limited to cases of 
known exonerations—and, indeed, procedural justice is threatened when the 
trier of fact allows racial assumptions or prejudice to enter into the calculus 
of decision.  But when jurors (and judges) operate on either known or even 
unconscious biases to convict the innocent, the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system is threatened. 
 
158 Id. 
159 David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” 
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268 (1999). 
160 Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621 (2005). 
161 Dianne Martin, Lessons About Justice From The “Laboratory” of Wrongful 
Convictions: Tunnel Vision, The Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC. L. 
REV. 847 (2002). 
162 GOULD, supra note 28. 
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new trial, the courts must be persuaded that no reasonable juror (or judge in 
a bench trial) could have concluded that the defendant was guilty.163
Virginia has now replaced its twenty-one-day rule with a Writ of 
Actual Innocence,
  The 
defendant’s task is even more onerous when states maintain procedures, as 
Virginia did for decades, that a motion for new trial based on exculpating 
evidence had to be filed within twenty-one days of the order of conviction.  
As any criminal trial lawyer knows, it is rare to the point of unknown for 
important, new evidence to come to light within three weeks of sentencing. 
164 a procedural outlet that other states are considering.  
But a promising law on the books does not necessarily translate to actual 
exonerations if the courts that administer the law are systematically 
skeptical of non-biological evidence.  Indeed, it is hardly coincidental that 
the vast majority of exonerations were achieved not because the courts 
stepped in and ordered a new trial or habeas corpus relief, but because 
governors or other political leaders, including parole boards, intervened.  In 
some cases, they had the active support of prosecutors, who admirably 
came forward to rectify what they believed had been a miscarriage of 
justice.  But as Daniel Medwed’s research also has shown, the institutional 
culture of some prosecutors’ offices creates an environment in which 
“resistance to post-conviction innocence claims is an accepted and 
pervasive cultural norm” that helps prosecutors avoid being seen as soft on 
crime.165
Finally, it is important to note the role of the media in both creating the 
conditions for wrongful convictions and investigating doubtful cases 
postconviction to help defendants prove their innocence.  One of the 
background conditions that raises the possibility of a wrongful conviction is 
the heinousness of the underlying crime.  Brutal rapes and murders, 
multiple murders, and crimes against children particularly inflame the 
sensibilities of the public and understandably lead to calls to catch and 
punish the criminal as quickly as possible.  When these crimes also generate 
press coverage—especially the sensational coverage of televised media—
there arises a continuous drumbeat of pressure for authorities to “do 
something” to apprehend a suspect.  Under these circumstances, research 
shows, police officers and prosecutors may feel rushed to complete their 
  In such cases, an innocent but convicted defendant faces even 
greater obstacles in rectifying the error done to him. 
 
163 Unlike in a criminal trial, where the prosecution must establish the defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, in postconviction proceedings the defendant must show that no 
reasonable juror (or judge in a bench trial) could have concluded that the defendant was 
guilty.  See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 548, 537-40 (2006). 
164 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.10 (2007). 
165 Daniel Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistant to Post-Conviction Claims of 
Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 130 (2004). 
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investigations and, resultantly, may fall prey to tunnel vision that has them 
pursuing the wrong suspect. 
At the same time, the media, or more specifically, print reporters, have 
been instrumental in establishing the innocence of some defendants who 
otherwise would have spent years in prison if not faced the prospect of 
execution.  Perhaps the most famous are former journalists, now 
Northwestern University professors, David Protess and Robert Warden, 
whose investigations with their students helped to uncover errors in several 
Illinois cases.  They were aided by Ken Armstrong, Steve Mills, and 
Maurice Possley, all writers for the Chicago Tribune, whose “exposé” on 
erroneous capital convictions in Illinois was instrumental in convincing 
then-Governor George Ryan to commute the sentences of Illinois’s death 
row population and to issue a moratorium on further capital prosecutions 
until additional reforms could be considered.  Warden has written about this 
process and the power that investigative journalism can have in raising 
awareness of wrongful convictions and building the constituency for 
reform.166  As his Center on Wrongful Convictions167
[i]t wasn’t that Americans didn’t care that innocent men and women were rotting in 
prison or on death row, but rather that most people simply couldn’t accept the fact that 
such miscarriages of justice could happen on a large scale.  When the public and the 
legal profession finally did come to recognize the alarming scope of the problem, it 
turned out that there was a great deal of interest.
 explains, 
168
IV. IMPROVING THE RESEARCH 
 
We agree with Gross and O’Brien on the need to improve the research 
conducted on wrongful convictions, for very few of the studies to date have 
employed controls.  Certainly, we know that several systemic problems are 
associated with wrongful convictions, but is it possible that those failings 
are found in criminal prosecutions as a whole, regardless of whether the 
defendant is innocent?  Put another way, might a case of rightful conviction 
see the same kinds of failures as a wrongful conviction?  Or, conversely, is 
it possible that a defendant could be rightly acquitted even when facing 
such problems as an erroneous identification or incomplete forensic 
evidence?  In a perfect world of research, we would clamor for studies that 
employ an effective control group, but here that is difficult to obtain.  
Unlike in medical research, a suspect may not be randomly assigned to a 
 
166 See Rob Warden, The Revolutionary Role of Journalism in Identifying and Rectifying 
Wrongful Convictions, 70 UMKC L. REV. 803 (2003). 
167 Warden serves as executive director of Northwestern University’s Center on 
Wrongful Convictions. 
168 About Us, Center on Wrongful Convictions, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
wrongfulconvictions/aboutus/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
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treatment group at the start of a criminal case.  Some of this is logistical,169 
but more importantly, our system of constitutional rights would not permit 
it.170
Where controls have been employed, researchers generally have 
compared cases of wrongful conviction with those of rightful conviction or 
have examined exonerations against cases of presumed innocence in which 
the defendant was executed.  In the first set of comparisons, researchers 
effectively have asked, why does the criminal justice system work properly 
in some cases (the rightful convictions) but not in others (the wrongful 
convictions)?  In others, they presume that the criminal justice system has 
failed both sets of defendants (as all were wrongly convicted) but then ask 
why the system was able to correct the errors in some cases (those who 
were released) but not in others (cases in which a presumably innocent 
defendant was executed). 
 
A classic example of the first matched comparison study is Talia 
Harmon’s 2001 article in Justice Quarterly.171  Harmon assembled a data 
set of seventy-six cases from 1970 to 1998 in which capital inmates were 
released from death row because of “doubts about their guilt”172
Harmon’s study is interesting on several levels.  First, it occupies a 
hybrid position between predicting which sources may cause a wrongful 
conviction in capital cases and which factors will lead the system to correct 
its errors.  For example, the amount of evidence introduced at trial could 
explain why a wrongful conviction occurred (some trial attorneys 
presumably not doing their job) and why an appellate court would grant a 
defendant’s release from death row (the lawyer’s ineffective assistance 
justifying a successful appeal).  Interestingly, Harmon’s work showed that 
 and 
compared them to a random sample of matched inmates who were 
convicted at trial and executed for their crimes.  Using logistic regression, 
Harmon identified several independent variables that distinguished the two 
sets of cases.  In her study, capital inmates were more likely to be released 
if new evidence had been discovered, if the defense alleged perjury by 
prosecution witnesses, if the appeal was handled by a private lawyer or one 
from a resource center, or if fewer forms of evidence had been introduced at 
trial. 
 
169 It would be nearly impossible to predict at the start of a case which defendants would 
be subject to, say, junk science, whereas others would be provided complete and accurate 
forensic results. 
170 Indeed, the Sixth Amendment would prohibit any effort to assign one group of 
defendants to capable lawyers and another group to incompetent counsel. 
171 Talia Roitberg Harmon, Predictors of Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 18 
JUST. Q. 949 (2001). 
172 Id. at 957. 
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the type of lawyer at trial (public defender or privately retained) did not 
predict whether a defendant would be released on appeal, but the data 
indicated that type of appellate lawyer—and thus, either quality or available 
resources173
The other curiosity about Harmon’s work is that she does not fully 
define whether the defendants released from death row were factually 
innocent.  In pulling from Radelet and colleagues’ 1996 work,
—affected the chance of release. 
174 she notes 
that there were “doubts” about the defendants’ guilt.175
Harmon later teamed up with criminologist William Lofquist to 
compare matched sets of capital defendants that the researchers claimed 
were innocent.
  To be sure, each of 
the defendants was released from death row, but it’s not the case that each 
defendant was exonerated and released from prison.  Thus, to some extent, 
Harmon’s study tells us more about when and why the criminal justice 
system will grant capital appeals than it does about the sources of wrongful 
convictions.  Still, it’s interesting that several of her findings dovetail 
closely with prior case studies on wrongful convictions.  In her list of 
statistically significant predictors, one finds variables associated with 




173 In identifying private counsel or resource center lawyers as the most successful on 
appeal, Harmon’s work uncovers a belief widely presumed among the defense community.  
Lawyers from large firms who handle direct or habeas corpus appeals on a pro bono basis 
are often able to marshal substantial talent and resources for the defense.  Similarly, lawyers 
from capital resource centers have more specialized training and experience than other 
attorneys who may take these cases.  None of this should be seen as denigrating the work of 
other capital appellate attorneys; rather it is the regular experience and available resources of 
other lawyers that may give them a greater leg-up in appellate work. 
  In one set, the defendants had been released from prison; 
in the other, the defendants had been executed.  Thus, Harmon and Lofquist 
sought to examine why the criminal justice system worked—or did not—in 
freeing the wrongly convicted from death row.  Their results mirrored many 
of Harmon’s findings in her earlier study, concluding that defendants who 
had a private or resource center lawyer representing them at trial (as 
opposed to a public defender), whose prosecutions relied on fewer forms of 
evidence at trial, who raised allegations of perjury on appeal, who did not 
have a prior felony record, or whose case involved an African-American 
defendant and a white victim were significantly more likely to be formally 
exonerated. 
174 Radelet, Lofquist & Bedau, supra note 17. 
175 Harmon, supra note 171, at 957. 
176 Talia Roitberg Harmon & William S. Lofquist, Too Late for Luck: A Comparison of 
Post-Furman Exonerations and Executions of the Innocent, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 498 (2005). 
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Whereas Harmon and Lofquist sought to compare the innocent-
exonerated to the innocent-executed, Gross and O’Brien have compared the 
innocent-exonerated to the guilty-executed.177  In a sense, they were asking 
different questions.  Harmon and Lofquist were interested in why the 
criminal justice system failed the innocent after a capital conviction.  Gross 
and O’Brien, by contrast, provided a more descriptive analysis of capital 
litigation, essentially asking what is unique about capital cases that leads to 
exoneration in some cases and execution in others.178
Gross and O’Brien’s analysis relied on chi-square tests rather than 
regression equations, but their results offer modest predictors for why 
capital cases may end in exoneration over execution.  As they note, capital 
defendants who were exonerated were significantly less likely to be 
reported as mentally ill, more likely to have been tried for crimes that 
involved two or fewer victims or child victims, less likely to have 
confessed, more likely to have claimed innocence at trial, and more likely to 
have had an extensive criminal record (especially violent felonies) than 
those who were executed.
  Admittedly, any 
wrongful conviction is, by definition, a failure, but at least postconviction 
exoneration avoids the most tragic of possibilities—the execution of an 
innocent person. 
179
Gross and O’Brien correctly note the limitations of studying wrongful 
convictions this way.
 
180  By relying on official exonerations to define the 
set of wrongful convictions, they leave out cases in which a defendant is 
actually innocent but cannot reach the heightened bar of proof 
postconviction.181
 
177 Gross & O’Brien, supra note 
  Furthermore, they concentrate our attention on capital 
rape/murder, in which DNA evidence is more likely to be found than in 
most other types of cases and can offer better “objective” evidence of 
innocence or guilt.  Indeed, rather than explaining why some defendants are 
wrongly convicted, research like that of Gross and O’Brien may tell us 
4. 
178 Of course, it is possible that some of the executed defendants were, in fact, innocent 
and should have been exonerated.  But, as Gross and O’Brien note, “[f]or those who were 
put to death, the legal system concluded that there was no evidence of innocence sufficient to 
stop the executions.  For those who were exonerated, the system determined there was 
sufficient evidence of innocence to require that the defendants be cleared and released.”  Id. 
at 948. 
179 Id. at 952-57. 
180 As they contend, “[a]lmost everything that we do know [about wrongful convictions] 
is based on information about exonerations, and it is clear that exonerations are highly 
unrepresentative of wrongful convictions in general.” Id. at 958. 
181 Whereas the state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, a convicted 
defendant must establish that no reasonable person would believe him guilty in 
postconviction proceedings.  See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538-40 (2006). 
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more about how some capital defendants are able to secure postconviction 
release. 
Even accepting these limitations, we would hardly doubt the 
significance of their work.  To a large extent, their research helps to explain 
why some capital cases “go right” in the system while others fail.182
Perhaps the most comprehensive study of wrongful convictions using a 
matched comparison sample methodology to date is Brandon Garrett’s 
analysis of the first two hundred innocent defendants to be released after 
postconviction DNA testing exonerated them.
  
Moreover, their work needs to be read in tandem with the findings from 
several other studies of wrongful convictions.  Although Gross and 
O’Brien’s study presents at least one seeming anomaly (exonerations were 
less likely among those considered mentally ill), their findings confirm and 
add more detail to the picture of wrongful convictions that has emerged 
from prior research.  Examining their findings as a whole, one sees that 
capital exonerations were more likely in sensational cases, in cases 
investigated more hurriedly, and when police officers already presumed the 
suspect to have criminal proclivities. 
183
For the most part, Garrett found that postconviction claims were raised 
and resolved at similar rates for both groups of defendants.  Although 1% to 
2% of criminal convictions are reversed on appellate review, the rate in 
both sets of cases was higher—9% for the DNA exonerations and 10% for 
the control group.  These shared rates likely reflect the greater proportion of 
rape and murder cases in both groups, the kinds of crimes in which courts 
are most likely to step in and reverse a faulty conviction.  But, it is 
distressing to the point of tragic that the court system could have missed the 
innocence of so many eventual exonerees.  Recall that all of the defendants 
in Garrett’s first group were exonerated by DNA testing, yet in only 9% of 
the cases did the defendant win his freedom on appellate review prior to 
  Of these, Garrett selected 
a subset of non-capital cases in which a written decision was available and 
matched them to a random set of non-capital cases in which DNA evidence 
was not available; in the control group, then, Garrett did not know whether 
the defendants were innocent or guilty.  His goal was to understand how the 
criminal justice system handled the cases of persons wrongly convicted but 
eventually exonerated by postconviction DNA testing. 
 
182 Such judgments presume, of course, that capital punishment is acceptable.  We leave 
such questions to the many other articles on the subject and note, instead, that the issue here 
is whether the criminal justice system works as intended.  In this respect, we categorically 
oppose any who would claim that a wrongful execution is an acceptable cost for a system of 
capital punishment.  See generally Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
183 Brandon Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008). 
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postconviction testing.  Somewhere in this, the criminal justice system 
failed the innocent.  Garrett’s work helps to explain why.  As he describes, 
“these exonerees could not effectively litigate their factual innocence, likely 
due to a combination of unfavorable legal standards, unreceptive courts, 
faulty criminal investigation by law enforcement, inadequate representation 
at trial or afterwards, and a lack of resources for factual investigation that 
might have uncovered miscarriages.”184
Together, the studies of Harmon, Lofquist, Gross, O’Brien, and Garrett 
add considerably to our knowledge of wrongful convictions while 
confirming many of the sources previously identified that explain why 
wrongful convictions occur and are difficult to correct.  That said, there is 
more that can be done to expand that knowledge base.  As we have 
explained elsewhere,
 
185 the field will benefit from additional empirical 
research, continuing the pattern of matched comparison samples.  These 
methods would allow scholars to more accurately determine which factors 
are uniquely present in wrongful conviction cases as well as to statistically 
test hypotheses about which factors may be causally related to or predict 
wrongful conviction.186
Wrongful conviction cases, of course, are the most dramatic examples 
of how the system got the crucial question—the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant—wrong.  They illustrate a breakdown in the accuracy of human 
judgment at multiple levels: police investigation, prosecution, pre-trial 
motions, judicial rulings, and ultimately trial verdicts.
 
187  Cases of rightful 
acquittal, by contrast, illustrate how the criminal justice process (or at least 
the court system) got it right in acquitting or dismissing charges against a 
factually innocent person and thus sparing him the fate of being wrongfully 
convicted.  What we want to know—and thus what dictates our matching 
strategy—is which factors are uniquely present in the cases that lead the 
system to rightfully acquit or dismiss charges against the innocent188
 
184 Id. at 131. 
 that 
are not present in cases that lead the system to wrongfully convict the 
185 Leo & Gould, supra note 80. 
186 In the interests of full disclosure, we have just begun such a project, with funding 
from the National Institute of Justice, to collect data from and compare cases of wrongful 
conviction and rightful acquittal to understand which factors explain why innocent 
defendants are convicted in some cases and acquitted in others.  By “rightful acquittal,” we 
mean factually innocent defendants who were cleared of charges following indictment but 
before conviction. 
187 Except, that is, in cases of wrongful conviction by plea bargain, but those matters are 
comparatively rare.  See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 13, at 55-56; Gross et al., supra note 
45, at 537-38.   
188 This is arguably the most important goal of the criminal justice system. 
864 JON B. GOULD & RICHARD A. LEO [Vol. 100 
innocent.189
V. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROFESSIONALS, POLICYMAKERS,  
AND POLITICIANS 
  If we understand this, then it is a relatively short step to 
understanding what policy interventions can influence the justice system to 
get it right and acquit the innocent, thereby preventing future wrongful 
convictions. 
We say a “short step” to policy intervention somewhat tongue-in-
cheek, for identifying the most appropriate interventions and implementing 
them are vastly different processes; this distinction has been noted by 
several of the authors who have written about wrongful convictions.190  
Garrett, for example, is uncertain about the prospects of reform, saying that 
“none will be accomplished through change in legal doctrine, but rather, 
through a surprising explosion in public information about the causes of the 
most egregious errors in our criminal justice system, this information will 
lead to reform through the conduit of civil rights suits.”191  Zalman, while 
agreeing with Garrett about the difficulties of reform, doubts the power of 
litigation to bring about systemic change.  As he says, civil suits can 
“initiate and highlight problems, but without other levers of change, it is 
unlikely that deep policy modifications will occur.”192  A scholar of public 
administration as well as criminal justice, Zalman reminds us that the 
process of implementing reforms is a multifaceted mechanism, “which 
extends conceptually from problem perception and agenda building, to 
policy formulation, legitimation, adoption, and budgeting, and to 
implementation, evaluation, and termination or redesign.”193  Indeed, as he 
says, the criminal justice system too often lacks the ability to “reflect on its 
own shortcomings and to correct them.”194
Findley extends Zalman’s critique of the criminal justice system, 
claiming that reform “cannot be undertaken just by gathering lawyers 
together to think about the rules that govern trials.”  In Findley’s view, 
change must be seen as a “holistic” process “with input from experts and 
 
 
189 This is arguably the worst possible error the criminal justice system can make short of 
executing the innocent. 
190 Keith A. Findley, Learning From Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to 
Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333 (2002); Garrett, supra note 183; 
Marvin Zalman, Criminal Justice System Reform and Wrongful Conviction, 17 CRIM. JUST. 
POL’Y REV. 468 (2006). 
191 Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction 
Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 111. 
192 Zalman, supra note 191, at 483. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 485. 
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stakeholders involved at every step in the process.”195  We agree, and 
indeed, the work of one of us with the Innocence Commission for Virginia, 
confirms Findley’s view.  “Change” does not come about simply because 
researchers or commissions produce reports about the number or sources of 
wrongful convictions.  Rather, as political scientist John Kingdon would 
explain, policy change occurs when an actor, an initiative, and a policy 
window all converge at the same time.196
Empirical research can help to “ripen” the agenda for reform, as the 
publication—and publicizing—of cases of wrongful conviction can start to 
create a “record” of a problem that warrants attention.  In this respect, the 
wrongful conviction movement has been successful in marshalling the 
evidence of DNA exonerations to demand that the criminal justice system 
and policymakers respond to a problem of erroneous convictions.  But the 
window for such reforms may be closing.  Part of the reason concerns the 
natural flow of policy change.  According to political scientists Frank 
Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, policy diffusion looks like a logistic S-
shaped curve.  “Policy adoption is slow at first, then very rapid, then slow 
again as the saturation point is reached.”  Change tends to happen quickly, 
returning to long periods of equilibrium as the “attention of governmental 
elites” wanes, and “the apathy of those not keenly interested in the 
particular issue” allows problems to recede from the policy agenda.
  To outsiders, the process may 
appear as “an idea whose time has come,” but to Kingdon, policy change 
does not happen by chance.  Actors must still pressure decision makers with 
a plausible proposal when that agenda is ripe for consideration. 
197  With 
wrongful convictions a key part of the national policy debate for twenty 
years now,198 we may be at a point where the issue just naturally wanes.  
Indeed, since the passage of the Innocence Protection Act in 2004,199
But there is more.  Arguably, it was DNA exonerations—especially 
those of death row defendants—that propelled the issue of wrongful 
convictions to the national agenda.  DNA testing made it virtually 
impossible to doubt the innocence of those exonerated, and the realization 
that several of these individuals came within months or even days of 
execution drew attention to the issue in a way that numerical reports could 
 
Congress has shown little interest in the subject. 
 
195 Findley & Scott, supra note 131, at 341. 
196 JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1995). 
197 FRANK BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 18 (1993). 
198 In many ways, the “modern era” of wrongful convictions was kicked off on August 
14, 1989, when Gary Dotson was exonerated by a postconviction DNA test.  GOULD, supra 
note 28, at 17. 
199 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006). 
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not.  However, as DNA testing has become more commonplace at the 
beginning of criminal investigations, it is arguable that there will be fewer 
indisputable cases of innocence to generate attention postconviction.  On 
one hand, this is a tremendous accomplishment, as better forensic evidence 
weeds out innocent suspects before they are indicted or convicted.  But at 
the same time, it may well be harder to establish innocence in the larger 
percentage of cases where biological evidence is unavailable.  If judges, 
prosecutors, governors, and even the public have become accustomed to 
equating exonerations with DNA testing, will they be so willing to see and 
trust evidence of innocence when it is non-biological?  If Virginia is a 
guide, the future is doubtful.200
In the end, our concern is not so much with the state of research on 
wrongful convictions as it is whether professionals within the criminal 
justice system will be willing to respond to that research with appropriate 
initiative.  To be sure, we believe that social science research has much 
more it can offer to the study of wrongful convictions.  But the research to 
date—even with some of its natural methodological limitations—has 
provided us considerable insight into the sources, consequences, and 
potential remedies for wrongful convictions.  It is, instead, the professionals 
who staff our criminal justice system and the politicians and policymakers 
who employ them that may require the more significant improvement.  
Considering the interests at stake in a criminal prosecution and 
conviction—especially when the crime carries a capital charge—it is 
incredible to the point of embarrassing that the American system of justice 
has been so resistant to innocence commissions or post-exoneration review. 
 
This recalcitrance stands in stark relief to the openness that both the 
medical profession and the transportation sector have brought to learning 
from mistakes.201  In hospitals, doctors regularly meet in morbidity and 
mortality conferences to “investigate the reasons and responsibility for 
adverse outcomes of care.”202
 
200 In 2008, Darrell Andrew Copeland became the first petitioner in Virginia to succeed 
on a writ of actual innocence, when the Court of Appeals dismissed his conviction for felony 
gun possession.  According to the appeals court, more than 120 petitions for writs of actual 
innocence have been rejected.  Copeland is the only inmate whose petition has been 
supported by the attorney general.  Posting of Cjay to NowPublic, Va. Court Grants First 
Writ of Actual Innocence in Chesapeake Case, http://www.nowpublic.com/world/ 
va-court-grants-first-writ-actual-innocence-chesapeake-case (Aug. 13, 2008, 21:57). 
  Similarly, the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) dispatches investigators immediately after a major 
transportation accident and then convenes a hearing to examine the causes 
of the tragedy in order to prevent future errors.  As the NTSB explains, 
201 Doyle, supra note 5. 
202 LINDA T, KOHN, JANET M. CORRIGAN & MOLLA S. DONALDSON, TO ERR IS HUMAN: 
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 269 (2000). 
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more than 80% “of its recommendations have been adopted by those in a 
position to effect change.  Many safety features currently incorporated into 
airplanes, automobiles, trains, pipelines and marine vessels had their 
genesis in NTSB recommendations.”203
If there was a good candidate for post-error review, it would be the 
criminal justice system.  Wrongful convictions do such harm to so many
 
204 
that one would expect criminal justicians to seek out the lessons from past 
errors in order to prevent them.  And yet, experience suggests otherwise.  
Only a handful of states have undertaken serious and systematic review of 
wrongful convictions,205 and when practitioners have been involved, it has 
often taken “kicking and screaming” to introduce new approaches or 
technologies to improve their work.206
This level of resistance, such astounding ignorance and fear, should 
not be tolerated in any profession, but nowhere is this more important than 
in the criminal justice system.  The stakes are simply too high to put our 
heads in the sand and pretend that the research uncovered on erroneous 
convictions does not warrant attention.  To be sure, few would claim that 
the criminal justice system fails more often than it succeeds, but success is 
premised to an extent on learning from past mistakes to prevent them in the 
future.  Contrary to the claims of some detractors, we are not “demanding 
an impossibility—a perfect system.”
 
207  Rather, as we have explained 
before, wrongful convictions “demand the best from the state’s penal 
power.”208
 
203 About the NTSB, History and Mission, http://www.ntsb.gov/Abt_NTSB/history.htm 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
  Not because review will lead to an error-free process, but 
because professionalism demands it. 
204 In addition to the innocent suspect who is convicted and imprisoned, wrongful 
convictions harm victims, who must relive the crime a second time if the actual perpetrator is 
caught and a new trial is pursued; the general public, which is at risk while dangerous 
criminals remain free; taxpayers, who must cover civil damages to the wrongly convicted; 
and police officers, prosecutors, and judges, whose reputation for fairness and 
professionalism may be at risk. 
205 Consider the North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission, North Carolina Actual 
Innocence Commission—Mission Statement, Objectives, And Procedures, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/NC_Innocence_Commission_Mission.html (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2010), the Ryan Commission in Illinois, Executive Order as Issued by 
Former Governor George Ryan, Creating the Commission on Capital Punishment, 
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/executive_order.html  (last visited Mar. 23, 2010), and 
the Innocence Commission for Virginia, http://www.icva.us (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
206 Strange Justice, http://stju.blogspot.com/2006/07/maximum-use-of-videotaping- 
indicated.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2010). 
207 Marquis, supra note 37. 
208 GOULD, supra note 28, at 244. 
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Looking to the future, social science research will undoubtedly expand 
our understanding of wrongful convictions and system failures.  But unless 
criminal justice professionals, policymakers, and politicians are truly open 
to these findings and are willing to adopt new measures in light of the 
research, the research threatens to become, quite literally, an academic 
exercise.  The first century of research has taken us to a point of revelation 
and burgeoning reform.  Whether the next stage of investigation will be as 
illuminating and valuable may depend more on practice than research. 
